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A number of high profile Buddhist majoritarianisms across Southern Asia have attract-
ed both the attention and alarm of scholars and activists in recent months. The rheto-
ric and actions of nationalist Buddhists have left many wondering about the remedies 
available to minority groups and the legal management of religion in predominantly 
Buddhist nations. Is the exercise of constitutional law an effective instrument for en-
suring interreligious harmony and adjudicating interreligious disputes? What lessons 
from the history of the postcolonial legal management of religious life in Sri Lanka 
lie in wait for scholars and practitioners whose engagements with constitutional law 
are largely constrained to English-speaking, Euromerican juridical environments? The 
central thesis of Benjamin Schonthal’s Buddhism, Politics, and the Limits of Law: The 
Pyrrhic Constitutionalism of Sri Lanka is that when it comes to Sri Lanka’s frequently 
tendentious and acrimonious religious disputes, the exercise of constitutional law itself 
exacerbates, rather than ameliorates, conflicts amongst individuals and communities 
with differing religious commitments and visions of what constitutes the ideal rela-
tionship between the authority vested in religious, civil, and state actors (11). Reading 
together multivalent histories of Sri Lanka’s postcolonial drafting and juridical legal 
invocations related to the management of Buddhism in particular, Schonthal argues 
that such a potential for conflict is in fact inherent to both the process and exercise of 
constitutional practice in the first place (7, 259). In order to analyze these dynamics, 
he introduces the framework of “pyrrhic constitutionalism,” in which the outcomes of 
the exercise of constitutional law over matters related to religion significantly under-
mine its aims and ambitions (12), akin to a “pyrrhic victory,” where the great cost of 
an achievement negates its successes. 
Methodologically, the bulk of the book is comprised of what Schonthal terms “con-
stitutional microhistories” (19). These are close examinations of the quotidian legal, 
social, and political contexts surrounding the development of a constitutional provi-
sion, revision, or especially a legal case surrounding the invocation of constitutional 
law in the adjudication of a particular religious dispute. Schonthal brings not only 
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the relevant text of constitutional provisions to bear on these microhistorical analyses 
which constitute the second half of the book, but the idiosyncratic, on-the-ground 
experiences and actions of local, oftentimes marginalized actors with the intent of 
demonstrating both how they were situated in broader legal and political currents, as 
well as illuminating disjunctures between their experiences and the anticipated out-
comes of constitutional practice. 
Legal scholars will find the book’s engagement with the aims and limitations of 
constitutional law in the second, third, and fourth chapters particularly interesting 
because of their close analysis of Sri Lanka’s history of postcolonial constitutional 
drafting and revising. Schonthal identifies three broad paradigms respecting the legal 
place of Buddhism on the island—promotional, protectionist, and promotional—that 
have defined and contextualized disputes over the constitutional management of re-
ligion beginning with but intensifying after the ratification of its first constitution in 
1948 (58–59). Of particular interest here is his close reading in the fourth chapter of 
the legal process leading to the ratification of the 1972 constitution which inscribed 
the “foremost place of Buddhism (98).” Carefully reading from draft versions of reso-
lutions and memoranda submitted by interest groups on to the eventual ratification 
of the “Buddhism Chapter” through assembly debate, he argues that the chapter’s 
“multivalent language”—the result of a set of compromises between powerful stake-
holders such as key government ministers, the island’s monastic fraternities (nikāyas), 
and Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and secularist groups—demonstrates that even the 
legal process of enshrining the proper place for the island’s dominant religious tradi-
tion reveals a reliance on the law’s power of “ambiguity and incompleteness” despite 
its aims to clarify and particularize (144–45).
For scholars of Buddhism and religious life in South Asia, the second half of the 
book offers a number of “constitutional microhistories” in the fifth, sixth, and seventh 
chapters which closely examine many of the key moments in which the language of the 
1972 constitution has been tested. Schonthal offers a close examination of the litigants, 
arguments, and social contexts leading toward the adjudication of a specific legal is-
sue or case, such as that of a monk petitioning for a driver’s license (Chapter 6). He 
finds that all too frequently, the legal record of invocations of the Buddhism chapter 
has, contrary to its aims to protect Buddhism, undermined solidarity amongst and 
between monastic and lay Buddhist organizations by transforming what have histori-
cally been low-intensity disputes into increasingly high-stakes, public, and acrimonious 
contests over the politics of membership, definitions and protections of orthodoxy, 
and of the authority to define these (214–16).
The book’s strengths lie in these detailed historical examinations of the invocation 
of the Buddhism Chapter in a number of key legal battles which transpired during 
pivotal moments in Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 1980s and 1990s. These “constitutional 
microhistories” aptly demonstrate key moments where “religion” and “Buddhism” 
become “strategic categories deployed (often opportunistically and competitively) 
by constitutional lobbyists, litigants, lawyers and judges in order to group together 
particular actors, activities, and objects, and to render them constitutionally salient” 
(268). Despite the close contextual nature of these examinations, I would have liked 
to see a greater distinction in the author’s arguments between the nature of law itself 
and the conditions leading toward an increasing propensity of litigants to seek remedy 
from the law’s particularizing and galvanizing gaze. In addition, the book does not 
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make any recommendations for legal scholars or practitioners for how to make better 
use of constitutional law’s instruments, or for the use of a more equitable replacement. 
Despite this, the book constitutes a welcome intervention into both legal and religious 
studies scholarship by virtue of its close historical examinations of key moments in Sri 
Lanka’s attempts to manage religious affairs on the island.
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